The Great Conversation: The System Behind the Supreme Leader

Hello, everyone, and welcome back to The Great Conversation.

Leadership transitions rarely affect just one country — especially when that country plays a major role in regional and global politics.

Today, we explore what Iran looks like after Ayatollah Khamenei — not just who might succeed him, but how power actually functions inside the Islamic Republic… and what that could mean for the world.

In Tehran, a political question that was once whispered in back rooms is now at the center of Iran’s future. For now, one thing is clear: Ayatollah Khamenei may be gone, but the system he shaped is very much alive — and it is now fighting to decide who, or what, will embody its power next.re: after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who really rules Iran? His death has not only created a vacancy at the top of the Islamic Republic. It has exposed the complex, and often opaque, system that actually keeps the regime in power.

For four decades, Iran’s supreme leader has been portrayed as a single, towering figure — the final arbiter on war and peace, nuclear negotiations, economics, even culture. But the system he leaves behind is less a one‑man show and more a web of clerics, generals and institutions that have learned to survive under pressure.

Today, that web is under extreme stress. Iran faces US and Israeli air strikes, regional confrontation and deep domestic discontent at home. In that context, the battle over succession is not just about who wears the black turban next. It is about whether the Islamic Republic can maintain “Khamenei‑ism without Khamenei” — the same hard line, without the man who embodied it.

So, who are the players?

First, there is the Assembly of Experts, the clerical body that, on paper, is charged with choosing the next supreme leader. Its members are elected, but only from candidates filtered by regime insiders, which makes it more an inner circle than a parliament of conscience. In theory, they deliberate, debate, and then select a new leader. In practice, few observers expect them to act independently of the security establishment and Khamenei’s old network.

Second, there is the institution that many analysts see as the real power broker: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC. Over years of sanctions and conflict, the Guards have become not just a military force but an economic and political empire, with influence that runs through the oil sector, construction, telecommunications and regional proxy groups. They have every incentive to ensure that whoever comes next will protect their interests and keep Iran’s regional strategy intact.

Then there is the “hidden state” around the leader’s office, known in Persian as the Bayt‑e Rahbari — literally, the House of the Leadership. This office has evolved into a parallel state, managing appointments, money flows and key decisions behind the scenes. Even without Khamenei himself, this bureaucracy gives continuity to the system, making the supreme leadership less about a single person and more about an entrenched institution.

The constitution offers one roadmap: if there is a vacancy at the top, an interim leadership council can take over — a trio made up of the president, the head of the judiciary and a cleric from the Guardian Council. That council would oversee the transition while the Assembly of Experts decides on a permanent successor. On paper, this looks like orderly succession. In reality, it opens a window for intense bargaining, factional infighting and pressure from the IRGC.

What are the scenarios?

One possibility is continuity: a relatively low‑profile cleric from within Khamenei’s ideological camp is elevated, someone who can be trusted to preserve the system rather than transform it. Under this scenario, Iran would get a more collective style of rule — a weaker formal leader, but stronger institutions like the IRGC, the leader’s office and key councils. It would be, as some analysts put it, Khamenei‑ism without Khamenei.

Another possibility is a move towards explicit military dominance, where the IRGC plays an even more overt role in steering policy, perhaps behind a clerical figurehead. Years of war, sanctions and internal unrest have strengthened the Guards’ argument that only a security‑first state can keep Iran intact. In a moment of crisis, that logic may win out over the more traditional clerical establishment.

A third, less likely but much discussed scenario is a shift to some kind of leadership council instead of a single supreme leader. This idea has circulated since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and periodically resurfaces when the system seems too personalized. Power‑sharing among multiple figures could, in theory, spread risk and buy time, but it could also multiply rivalries and make decision‑making even more opaque.

And then there is the wildcard: regime collapse or a far deeper crisis than the current leadership intends. Years of protests, a struggling economy and the regime’s willingness to use brutal repression have all built up pressure inside society. A chaotic succession, especially in the middle of external military strikes, could rapidly turn that pressure into something harder to control — more mass demonstrations, elite defections, or fragmentation inside the security forces.

For ordinary Iranians, these maneuvers at the top are unfolding against a backdrop of economic hardship and political exhaustion. Many young people who took to the streets in recent years have little faith that a new supreme leader, from the same system, will suddenly deliver freedoms or prosperity. For them, the question “who rules Iran after Khamenei?” is inseparable from another: will the nature of that rule actually change?

For regional powers and for Washington, the stakes are also enormous. A successor aligned with the IRGC and committed to Iran’s existing regional network of militias would likely mean more of the same: continued nuclear brinkmanship, proxy wars and confrontation with Israel and the US. A more fragile or divided leadership, on the other hand, could create openings for diplomacy — but also risks miscalculation in a highly militarized environment.

In the coming months, the visible rituals — the funerals, the speeches, the official appointments — will attract most of the headlines. But the real story may lie in less visible signals: how much space the IRGC occupies, how far the Assembly of Experts is allowed to assert itself, and whether any figure emerges who can both reassure the elite and address the anger simmering in Iranian society.

For now, one thing is clear: Ayatollah Khamenei may be gone, but the system he shaped is very much alive — and it is now fighting to decide who, or what, will embody its power next.

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And now, in light of this reflection, please click the link and then continue with the article below from Financial Times for a deeper understanding of today’s discussion.

After Khamenei, who rules Iran?